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Silencing oneself, silencing others
Rethinking censorship comparatively [introduction]
Matei Candea
1 What  is  censorship?  Is  it  different  from
other forms of  silencing,  and if  so how?
For  some,  censorship  is  a  transgression
against a speaker imagined as essentially
free, and must be denounced, whether it
is  displayed in plain sight in totalitarian
regimes  or  hiding  in  the  secret  folds  of
Facebook’s  algorithms;  for  others,
censorship is an unduly negative name for
the inevitable (albeit never innocent) cuts
and  limitations  which define  and  shape  genres  and  styles  of  expression,  be  they
academic, artistic or everyday. On this latter view, expression is always entangled with
power, and policing the bounds of the sayable is just another field of political struggle—
a  struggle  which  takes  place  on  campuses,  in  courtrooms  or  online.  These  are
sometimes seen as two fundamentally opposed philosophical, political and epistemic
visions: a “modern” or “liberal” vision of censorship, opposed to a “postmodern” or
“relativist” one (Bunn 2015; Darnton 2015). Yet anthropologists in particular are well
placed to see that these are still arguments from a common ground, which draw from a
shared stock of Euro-American philosophical and political concepts and controversies.
2 To this discussion, anthropology can provide some useful disturbances by expanding
the cast  of  characters  and  the  range  of  modalities  of  silence  and  expression.
Ethnographic accounts disrupt familiar assumptions about communication and agency
by portraying contexts in which words cure (Lévi-Strauss 1949); in which silent songs
transform the states of mind of addressees who cannot hear them (Taylor 2017);  in
which  claims  to  understand  another’s  intention  constitute  a  grave  misstep  (Stasch
2008);  and in which confession becomes a form of competitive gift-giving, a flow of
words which confessors find they have to  struggle  against  rather than coax out  of
penitents (Rafael 1987).
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3 Yet  the  lessons  of  anthropology’s  comparative  explorations  go  beyond  the  blithe
postmodern observation that silencing is pervasive. An ethnographic attentiveness to
the varieties of silencing keeps in view the ways in which “censorship” is an evaluative
as well as a descriptive term. To speak of censorship is to mark out certain forms of
silencing  as  illegitimate  and  unacceptable.  Those  evaluative  distinctions  cannot  be
dissolved by analytical fiat, and they call for an attention to the ways in which acts of
silencing can be authorised or  critiqued:  for  instance,  when Chinese firewalls  meet
Muslim ethics  of  civility  (Wang,  this  volume);  when a history of  slavery becomes a
public secret in rural  Madagascar (Somda, this volume);  or when Nepalese villagers
passionately  resist  the  silencing  of  traditional  rituals  by  Maoist  revolutionaries  (de
Sales 2009). Not to mention the many ways in which anthropologists themselves have
struggled with the political and epistemic stakes of hearing silence as silence, and of
the proper ways in which silence should be spoken of—if at all.
4 In  a  productive  return,  these  reflections  also  help  to  recast  familiar  debates  about
censorship themselves in an ethnographic light, not as the conceptual frame for any
discussion of silencing, but as a particular variety of the concern with the powers of
silence. Along the way of this comparative journey through techniques of silencing, this
introduction suggests a broader observation: that the elusive distinction between
censorship and legitimate silencing often relates to a sense of proportion between the
silences actors imposes upon themselves and those which they are thereby authorised
to require of others.
 
Censorship and the liberal imagination
5 Censorship is a central concept in modern liberal political vocabulary, and like many
such modern concepts it is borrowed self-consciously from classical antiquity—in this
case from the Roman institution whose roots lay in the census and moral appraisal of
citizens (Dury 1995). The specificity of the modern liberal notion of censorship stands
out against the enormous variety of ways in which contemporary Euro-Americans refer
positively  to  the  joyful,  productive  or  restful  benefits  of  silence—often  imagined
somewhat  nostalgically  as  the  lost  goods  of  an  earlier  age  (e.g.  Corbin  2018).  By
contrast,  censorship denotes bad,  restrictive silencing,  wrongfully imposed upon an
unwilling agent.
6 There is a distinctive cultural logic to the liberal vision of censorship which deserves
unpacking. It relies for its coherence on two distinctions. The first, as literary theorist
Stanley Fish (1994) has famously argued, is that speech—or, more broadly, expression—
can be set  apart  as  a  special  form of  conduct  which is  essentially  about  conveying
contents  (meanings,  ideas,  opinions,  ideologies,  artistic  intuitions).  In  this  way,  the
liberal imaginary of censorship tends to reduce a range of forms (music, films, images,
actions) to versions or analogues of “speech” in this restricted sense of the conveyance
of  contents.  The  distinctness  of  expression  in  turn  grounds  the  distinctness  of
censorship: power can block individuals’ actions and restrict their freedoms in various
ways, but to speak of censorship  is to claim that there is something distinctive  about
restricting  freedom  of  expression.  The  second  key  distinction—outlined  by  legal
philosopher Frederick Schauer (2006: 150) in his attempt to describe the ontology of
censorship implied by liberal accounts—is between the uncoerced initial preferences of
a would-be speaker and the subsequent coercive intervention of the censor. Censorship
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implies the possibility of an ideally free, autonomous speaker. It also implies that there
is  a  specific  and  identifiable  location  from  which  censorship  operates:  a  specific
individual, or more commonly a group, who has the power to intervene in and limit the
expression of the censored agent.
7 In some obvious senses, censorship as defined above is a historical and ethnographic
reality: there have been and continue to be collectives and individuals who think of
themselves  as  censors,  who  understand  their  task  as  that  of  intervening  in  the
communicative preferences of others, on behalf of a ruling authority. But censorship
thus defined, or rather its elimination, is also an element of a certain liberal democratic
mythos. Liberal democracy understands its legitimacy in matters of communication by
opposition to a certain figure of censorship now relegated to a pre-democratic past, or
to a non-democratic elsewhere.
8 Concomitantly, an important feature of the political culture of liberal democracies is a
sense of perpetual vigilance against the reintroduction of censorship in new forms: in
the work of legal advisers inside publishing companies; in the ways in which experts
(be  they  museum  curators,  librarians  or  academics)  select  and  manage  public
knowledge;  in  the  macro-structuring  forces  of  the  market;  in  the  demands  of
representatives of particular religious or minority groups; or in the collective pressures
of opinionated comment on social media platforms. Anthropologists have occasionally
participated  in  this  work  of  collective  vigilance  by  seeking  to  “unmask”  the  new
censors hiding in seemingly anodyne places, and the small slippages which take us—
softly, softly—from official state-sanctioned censorship, all the way to “self-censorship”
(Bruyère & Touillier-Feyrabend 2006).
 
Other silences
9 Often,  however,  as  I  noted  above,  anthropological  contributions  to  the  topic  of
censorship have engaged with very different problematics, at some remove from the
questions  explored  in  the  previous  section.  Contributors  such  as  Bayly  show  the
particular edge which ethnography and close association with particular people give in
assessing the sophisticated mechanisms through which communication and silence can
animate  relationships  between  the  state  and  its  citizens,  even  when  no  obvious
censorship  is  in  play.  In  her  account,  Vietnamese  “mobilisation  posters”  occasion
silence  in  her  interlocutors,  and  yet  this  is  no  straightforward  instance  of  “self-
censorship”. Rather the silence is an answer to the sense that these posters are not
messages but crude, ugly tools demanding an immediate, “robotic” response—they seek
to  constitute  viewers  as  speaking  subjects  of  a  particularly  docile  kind.  In  return,
Bayly’s  interlocutors  exercised  silence  as  an  act  of  moral  will  and  intellectual
distinction.
10 Conversely,  Rappaport’s  contribution  shows  how  a  combination  of  ethnographic,
musicological and historical acumen can help us to hear silences even where quite the
opposite seems to prevail. Rappaport focuses on songs which the Toraja in Sulawesi
sing quite  willingly,  while  nevertheless  reporting that these songs are banned.  The
author unravels the context and history of this seeming paradox: the songs were once
at  the heart  of  rituals  of  fertility  and sexual  licence,  which missionary Christianity
suppressed. Once the rituals had disappeared, the songs could eventually resurface, and
even be staged as “cultural artefacts”. This decontextualisation left the words intact yet
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strangely  silent,  just  as  it  muted  the  rhythmic  and  musical  qualities  which  had
animated vital, desiring bodies. What was silenced here was not the content of the song
but its effect.
11 The anthropological archive is also full of accounts of societies in which
“the possession, articulation and circulation of knowledge are key to the definition
of social distinctions relating to age, gender and leadership and to the existence of
hierarchies and the distribution of power. Censorship, the control of behaviour and
speech,  is  thus  an  integral  feature  of  these  societies,  as  are  remarkable
independence and freedom of choice in different measure (Marcus 2006: 229)”.
12 Studies of secrecy surrounding initiation in particular (see Cros & Stoichita, Colleyn, 
this volume) unsettle the classic vision of censorship outlined in the previous section,
by portraying enforced silence as necessary, functional and productive of a social world
in which freedom and autonomy are nevertheless also present. Such settings are not
animated by the classic tension between the power of censorship, on the one hand, and,
on the other, an individual seeking to express their opinion or construct their identity.
When speech  is  no  longer  simply  a  vector  of  opinions  but  rather  “the  instrument
through which a man can become the property of another man” (Colleyn), teaching the
virtues  of  silence  takes  on  a  very  different  resonance,  invokes  other  materialities
—“s’alourdir la bouche” (Colleyn), “avoir une feuille sur la langue” (Cros & Stoichita). It
is not simply the nature of what is silenced (speech, images, postures, personal names)
but  the  entire  set  of  relations  surrounding  personhood  and  expression  which  are
reconfigured.
13 Implicitly or explicitly, such accounts of the productive, structuring effects of silencing
provide a comparative counterpoint to visions of censorship outlined in the previous
section. Yet, like all “frontal comparisons” (comparisons aligned across an “us v. Them”
axis, cf.  Candea 2018), these are disturbing not only because of the differences they
highlight, but also on account of the familiarities they entail. Thus, on the one hand, as
George  Marcus  (2006)  has  pointed out,  there  is  a  risk  of  such accounts  feeding  an
exoticist  imaginary,  providing  Western  readers  with  a  vision  of  “primitive”  or
“traditional” societies with their pervasive and productive silences as, precisely, the
inverse of  liberal  “modern” ones in which such features have been superseded,  for
better or worse.
14 Yet as Cros and Stoichita’s contribution makes clear, no such neat lines can be drawn—
the  stakes  of  silence  in  Lobi  initiation  entangle  the  anthropologist  too.  Her  usual
epistemological practices (documenting, revealing, describing) have to be reconfigured
since she has herself  partaken of and been transformed by initiation. The resulting
graphic representation in these pages seeks to combine the imperatives of telling and
not telling, showing and not showing. More broadly, clear-cut frontal binaries belie the
complexity of a connected world in which, as we saw above, Christian missionaries or
Maoist revolutionaries seek to silence the voice of local rituals while indigenous groups
make claims for  the protection of  their  intangible  cultural  property (Marcus 2006).
Frontal  comparisons,  furthermore,  tend  to  silence  the  obvious  facts  that  not  all
“Westerners” are “liberal”, nor are all anthropologists “Western”—they silence them in
order to articulate a more or less critical or productive contrast (Candea 2018). Indeed,
frontal comparison’s only—and in itself non-negligible—value in this case is the way it
cuts the liberal vision of censorship down to size, rendering it as no more nor less than
one logic, one ethnographic object, amongst others.
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15 Beyond this basic relativisation, however, the most disruptive effect of anthropological
accounts of “other” silences lies less in their exoticising potential than in their ability
to point towards similarities and continuities. Thus the reader of these pages can move
relatively effortlessly from accounts of the importance of silencing in initiation rituals,
to  Somda’s  intriguing  description  of  the  ways  in  which  the  memory  of  slavery  is
silenced  in  Anôsy  (Madagascar).  Slavery  remains  what  Michael  Taussig  (1999)  has
termed a “public secret” in Tanôsy society through the effect of everyday avoidances,
interactions  and  implications—a  “censure  sans  réels  censeurs”.  Somda  draws  on
Zempléni’s  (1996)  account  of  the  relational  dispositif—the  peculiar  “savoir  taire”—of
initiation  secrecy,  arguing  that  Tanôsy  society  as  a  whole  operates  as  a  scaled-up
version of the same interlocking dynamics.
16 Following  that  shift,  the  reader  will  have  little  trouble  recognising  some  similar
dynamics in Le Caisne’s harrowing account of the power of social  configurations to
extinguish meaningful speech about a widely reported and horrific case of incest in a
French village. She documents in precise detail the ways in which small verbal cues,
changes  of  subject,  refusals  to  speak  and  surprisingly  bluff  admissions  (“everyone
knew!”) combine to extinguish the sense that there is anything to talk about, in order
to re-establish a kind of unbroken banality and normality. Le Caisne’s intricate account
of the effect of these moves on her own near-inability to address the subject as an
ethnographer recalls the complex interweaving of the unspoken into anthropological
accounts of initiation: except that here, on home ground, the ethnographer sees it as
her duty—however difficult this proves to be in practice—to speak, to puncture the skin
of social secrecy.
17 Moving  across  these  cases,  broad  continuities  (or  at  least  contiguities)  in  the
mechanisms of silencing are crosscut by radical shifts in the moral positioning of the
anthropologist in relation to what is described. From cultural coherence and continuity
as a positive good which the anthropologist seeks to preserve by the maintenance of
select silences, via a discomfort about the tensions such consensus hides, through to a
frank denunciation of a collective silence which covered and in some respect allowed
an unspeakable crime.
18 Nevertheless, from the perspective of the liberal definition of censorship outlined in
the previous section, this effortless ethnographic slide across the mechanisms of what
one might call “social silencing” is disruptive because it makes the logic of censorship
uncomfortably  familiar.  For  behind  the  contiguities  lies  the  shadow  of  a  broader
generalisation: the relatively commonplace thought that censorship is, in the end, a
pervasive, unavoidable and banal aspect of all social life.
 
Censorship undefined
19 In spotlighting these questions, anthropologists are in tune with a broader shift over
the past few decades which has sometimes been described as “New Censorship Theory”
(Bunn 2015). New Censorship Theory is usually associated with a range of scholars at
the intersection of philosophy and the social sciences, such as Michel Foucault (1976),
Pierre Bourdieu (2002) or Judith Butler (1997), but it builds, as Bunn perceptively notes,
on a much older tradition within Western political theory, namely Marxist critiques of
the liberal public sphere. Marx and his followers have long critiqued the liberal claim
that  the  lifting  of  state  censorship  opens  up  a  zone  of  free  and  unimpeded
Silencing oneself, silencing others
Terrain | 2019
5
communication. Many, they noted, are still de facto excluded from this public sphere
mainly, but not only, along lines of class, education and wealth; nor is this supposedly
free “marketplace of ideas” without of its  own subtler determinations,  silences and
exclusions. 1 While challenging Marxism in many respects, the cultural theorists of the
late  twentieth  century  have  radically  expanded  these  critical  insights  into  a
deconstruction of the two key distinctions outlined in the first section as integral to the
cultural  logic  of  liberal  visions  of  censorship:  the  distinctiveness  of  communicative
action, on the one hand, and the separation between free agents and external coercion,
on the other.
20 Consider, firstly, the distinction between communication and other types of action. In
various settings and contexts, these authors have tracked the ways in which, always
and  everywhere,  discourse  is  structured,  shaped  and  constituted  by  power,  and
conversely they have built  in various ways on philosopher of  language J.L.  Austin’s
(1975) insight that words have real effects in the world. Extending the point beyond
words to expression more generally, they undermined the thought that communicative
action might be radically set apart from other classes of action. Of course, liberal legal
regimes which otherwise eschew censorship have frequently been content to silence
speech when it is not defined as really speech, but as something else—incitement to
violence or discrimination or libel, for instance. The same goes for images and other
expressive  forms:  these  can legitimately  be  silenced as  soon as  they  are  no longer
envisioned  merely  as  analogues  of  “speech”  but  as  incitative  actions.  When  the
members  of  the  French film classification  board  studied  by  Esquerre  (this  volume)
decide  to  make  films  inaccessible  to  certain  audiences,  these  decisions  are  not
grounded in the identification of illegitimate opinions or points of view, but in a set of
concerns  about  the  effects  of  images  of  sex  and  violence  on  the  psychology  or
behaviour  of  young  viewers.  These  moves  play  on  the  distinction  between
communication and action, moving certain entities from one side to the other of that
boundary—rather than challenging the distinction itself.
21 Much more challenging was the thought that expression itself, as meaningful action,
might have silencing effects: the claim, central to much New Censorship Theory, that
some  forms  of  expression  directly  interfere  with  other  actors’  ability  to  articulate
themselves in their own terms. Thus, for instance, philosopher Rae Langton (2006) has
argued that the repeated imagery of  domination in much mainstream pornography
warps and twists the ways in which women’s words can be heard and understood in
real-life communication about sexual desire—a process which can in some instances
make a  woman’s  “no!”  inaudible  as  really  meaning “no!”.  As  Schauer  (2006)  notes,
critiques such as Langton’s are in one sense very much internal to the liberal imaginary
of  censorship,  particularly  in  the  way they still figure  (some kinds  of)  silencing as
“bad”;  and  yet  they  deconstruct  the  liberal  distinction  between  free  speaker  and
restrictive censor from the inside, by showing how some expression indirectly silences
other  expression.  If  pornography  is  itself  a  form  of  (indirect)  censorship,  these
arguments ask, then on what grounds could one defend it from censorship?
22 Unpicking one distinction leads to unpicking the other. Showing that the very ability of
words to signify—let alone the ability of any speaker or writer to express themselves in
a particular genre, style or register—relies upon a whole range of prior speech events
also challenges the thought that one might identify a moment before the intervention of
the censor, a subject of enunciation who is prior to social or linguistic determination.
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Put otherwise, this is the realisation that censorship is not a merely a negative, limiting
force. Like power more generally in the Foucauldian view, censorship is productive: it
doesn’t  simply  block  but  also  elicits  and enables  expression on a  variety  of  scales.
Censorship is present at the very heart of communication because “the language of
others creates rules that make language possible precisely by making some language
impossible” (Schauer 2006: 153).  More generally,  censorship and self-censorship can
form an intrinsic part of the creative process of authors, guiding stylistic choices and
producing whole effects of genre, as Nora Gilbert (2013) has argued for Victorian novels
and  twentieth-century  Hollywood  films.  Brkovic  (this  volume)  explores  a  different
aspect of the “productive” nature of censorship playing out in the work of Yugoslav
filmmakers  of  the  socialist  period.  Censors  engaged  in  complex  negotiations  with
authors, shaping rather than simply banning films. Furthermore, censorship practices
could create a “buzz” around a movie which increased its visibility both locally and
internationally—to the extent that some filmmakers today complain wistfully that the
end of  state  censorship  has  also  destroyed  the  cultural  creativity  of  post-Yugoslav
cinema.  Hoek (this  volume) shows a different facet  of  the productivity of censorial
activity  by  tracing  the  interplay  of  regulation  and  representation  in  the  official
documents produced by the Bangladeshi Censor Board in the 1980s. While the Censor
Board sought to control film societies by requiring the production of an intrusive and
extensive  amount  of  regulatory  documentation,  Hoek  argues  that  these  societies
smuggled complex messages about the social  value of  art  films into the margins of
these  bureaucratic  documents  themselves,  condensing  them  into  the  logos  and
iconography with which they chose to represent themselves.
23 The combined effect  of  the critiques  and shifts  in  perspective associated with New
Censorship Theory was to reveal censorship as an intrinsic and ineradicable aspect of
meaning making. On this view, “[t]o be for or against censorship as such is to assume a
freedom that no one has. Censorship is” (Holquist 1994: 16).
 
Censorship, expertise and the arts of silence
24 Why,  then,  does  censorship  nevertheless  persist  as  a  term  of  denunciation  and
complaint?  How  can  we  explain  the  passionate  and  powerful  resistances  that  it
occasions?  A  cynic  would  reduce  the  problem to  the  bare  mechanisms  of  a  power
struggle over public expression as a limited good. If censorship is everywhere, then
they might conclude, with Stanley Fish (1994: 111), that “someone is always going to be
restricted next, and it is your job to make sure that the someone isn’t you”. Yet there is
an  alternative  to  this  view,  which  pays  more  attention  to  the  nature  of  what  is
expressed when actors complain about illegitimate silencing—beyond everyone’s self-
interested arguments for “the protection of speech they want heard and the regulation
of speech they want silenced” (Fish 1994:  110).  Paradoxically,  this alternative starts
from what might seem like a further flattening and deconstruction of the boundaries
between  censorship  and  other  kinds  of  silencing:  the  insight,  drawn  from  close
accounts of what censors actually do, that censors are a particular type of “experts”.
25 Anthropologists  such  as  Dominic  Boyer  (2003)  or  William  Mazzarella  (2013),  and
ethnographically minded historians such as Robert Darnton (2015), in their studies of
state  censors  in  Communist  East  Germany,  colonial  and  postcolonial  India  or  pre-
revolutionary France, have challenged the flat, stereotypical portrayal of state censors
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as mindless bureaucrats, simply erasing content at the behest of a totalitarian state.
The censors who emerge from these accounts are far more complex figures. Their skills
and expertise are shown to be comparable and indeed often continuous with those of
other intellectual producers—they are themselves often authors, critics or actors. Their
practice is shown to include not simply erasure and silencing, but often also editorship
and curation of content, in what was sometimes a collaborative, albeit unequal, process
with the authors of the work. Finally, we are given a sense of the ways in which some at
least of these censors understood themselves to be involved in important, valuable and
meaningful work—“a loving labor of cultural artisanry” (Boyer 2003: 538). Censorship
was not so different after all, Boyer claims, from
the compromises to individual vision forced by the “peer review” system in the
humanities  and  social  sciences  that  mediates  the  great  majority  of  academic
publications.  Of  course,  one  may  simply  argue  that  peer  review  and  related
“gatekeeper” practices are matters of safeguarding professional standards and not
genuine  “censorship”  (denoting  ideologically  oriented  interdiction).  But,  does
academic  professionalism  itself  not  also  involve  the  socialization  of  individual
authorship, the definition of the parameters of legitimate intellectual activity, the
cultivation of generic “disciplinary” standards of research methods, interpretation,
and representation, and so on? (Boyer 2003: 513–514)
26 This has all the appearances of another relativist levelling, and Boyer himself seems to
foresee this difficulty when he rather hopefully claims that his arguments “need not
dull the teeth of outcry against the political abuse of intellectual labor” (2003: 540). He
does not,  however,  give much of a sense of how this critical  demarcation might be
retained or reimagined.
27 To do this, one might borrow Schauer’s (2006) observation that describing censors as
experts  also  gives  a  way  to  talk  about—and  question—the  legitimacy  of  particular
groups to  determine content.  For  instance, Schauer  notes  that  many people  in  the
twenty-first-century USA do not balk at librarians selecting which books to stock, yet
would balk at the government (or even citizen pressure groups) dictating particular
deselections to librarians. And of course this particular demarcation is not fixed, but a
focus of ongoing struggles over legitimacy, as contemporary debates over decolonising
the curriculum, for instance, attest (e.g. Hage 2017). Censorship, Schauer concludes,
is  inevitable,  necessary  and  desirable—but  it  is  less  inevitable,  necessary  or
desirable that this group rather than that group do it. … The language of censorship
is thus the language of professionalism, the language of expertise, the language of
institutional competence, the language of separation of powers. It can also be, more
maliciously, the language of turf. (2006: 162)
28 There is a subtle but crucial difference between Boyer’s and Schauer’s positions. While
Boyer  relativises  the  liberal  idea  that  censorship  is  necessarily  illegitimate  by
comparing  it  to  journal  editorship,  Schauer  notes  that  censors,  editors  and  other
experts are always prone to being denounced as illegitimate. The point is not simply to
level censorship with other types of expertise, but to show that expertise (including
censorial expertise) is a critically and often hotly contested category.
 
On proportionality
29 Censorship would thus be the name we give to illegitimate expertise. This observation
takes us one step away from the relativist flattening of censorship into the unbounded
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category of “silencing”. But this in turn raises the question: is there any regularity to
the ways in which this illegitimacy is established and contested? A comparative reading
of three contributions to this special issue will help us to suggest a hypothesis.
30 Esquerre  describes  the  deliberations  of  members  of  the  French  film  classification
board. Sometimes described by others as censors, the members of the board staunchly
resist the label,  and consider themselves “classifiers”,  whereas Esquerre prefers the
term “suppressors”,  in order to distinguish his analytical  language from that of his
interlocutors. What they are quite clearly, however, is “experts” of a particular kind: a
collection of persons imagined as knowledgeable in different ways on account of their
age or profession. A claim to expertise is demonstrated also in the regularity of their
modes  of  interpretation,  which  Esquerre  details  in  his  piece.  Call  them  censors,
classifiers  or  “suppressors”,  the  members  of  the  board  exemplify  a  particular
intersection of forms of silencing which constitutes expertise. On the one hand, the
board constitutes the locus of legitimate “content-determining authority” in respect of
films in France. On the other, it aspires to this legitimacy and attains it only through a
set of self-imposed cuts and silences. To be legitimate, these classifiers must not speak
of certain things (such as the directors’ intentions), or not speak in certain ways (such
as through “value judgements”).
31 The articles by Aymes and Provost take us further away from the more obvious terrains
of censorship, and yet they both demonstrate the same structural interrelation at the
heart  of  expertise  and  institutional  competence  between  self-imposed  silences  and
authoritative speech, the kind of speech which can ground the legitimate silencing of
others. Aymes unpicks the layers and cross-cutting modes of silencing embedded in a
nineteenth-century  Ottoman document:  a  report  written by  the  Grand Vizir  to  the
Sultan,  concerning a diplomatic incident involving the Russian ambassador and the
seizure  of  a  putatively  fraudulent  Russian  boat.  As  in  the  historical  accounts  of
censorship in pre-revolutionary France (Darnton 2015) or early modern Britain (Shuger
2006), what needs to be silenced in this delicate political setting is not any particular
message or ideological content, but primarily talk as it impinges on reputation, honour
and trust. At the heart of these moves lies what Aymes describes as a commitment to
“silence  contradiction”,  to  cut  through  the  possibility  of  adverse  speech  by  the
production of incontrovertible evidence. And the document itself must demonstrate to
the  Sultan  that  this  has  been  done  and  done  well.  Crucially,  the  Grand  Vizir’s
institutional  competence  is  demonstrated  partly  through  what  the  document  itself
doesn’t say. Provost’s exploration of the work of coroners in contemporary New Delhi
takes us to a different setting in which experts find themselves reporting, in writing, to
a  higher  authority,  simultaneously  demonstrating  their  legitimacy  through  self-
imposed  silences—for  instance,  in  regard  to  interpretations  and  inferences  about
causes of death—and drawing on this legitimacy to impose their reading of the case—to
“silence  contradiction”.  The  documents  coroners  produce  ought  thus  to  be  read,
Provost urges, as the effects of a tense pragmatic play with the silences imposed by
professionalism.
32 Examining censorship through the prism of expertise, professionalism and institutional
competence thus highlights the meeting point in which self-imposed silences come to
authorise  the  legitimate  silencing  of  competing  views  or  particular  contents.  The
legitimacy  of  particular  actors’  silencing  moves  is  premised  in  part  on  their  own
adherence  to  conventions  of  professional  self-limitation  which  they  can  play  with,
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perhaps, but not shrug off. There is thus a crucial relation between the way collectives
of experts are silenced and the way they silence others.
33 This suggests a potential answer to the fraught question of how actors demarcate “the
social negotiation of accredited knowledge” from “the political abuse of intellectual
labour” (Boyer 2003): the ability to sustain certain forms of institutional silencing as
legitimate may well  depend in part  on the felt  sense of  proportionality  between the
silences and limits these institutions impose upon their own experts, and the silences
and limits which these experts are thereby authorized to impose upon others. Perhaps,
then  (pace Boyer),  the  difference  between  the  widespread  (albeit,  of  course,  not
uncontested) acceptance of the principle of academic peer review and the widespread
dissatisfaction with state socialist censorship during and after the fall of those regimes
points to something more than “a kind of a convenient fulcrum of intellectual counter-
distinction” (Boyer 2003: 512). Perhaps the latter’s claims to cultural expertise were
judged  by  many  to  be  less  robust  than  the  former’s in  part  because  of  a  felt
disproportion between what these censors required of others and what they required
of  themselves.  Critiques  of  censorship  often  imply  this  sort  of  evaluation:  What
standards do these censors adhere to? What forms of professional conduct are they
accountable  to?  What  stringent  forms  of  education  and  training  have  they  had  to
undertake in order to get to their position?2
34 On  the  horizon  of  these  concerns  lie  the  censorial  activities  of  those  wholly
unaccountable  non-human  agents—algorithms,  firewalls,  filters  and  other  semi-
autonomous devices—which populate the networked spaces of collective expression.
These non-human censors are a world-wide phenomenon, although Wang (this volume)
documents  one  particular  version  of  them  in  her  account  of  resistance  and  self-
censorship  in  a  digital  Islamic  space  embedded  in  China’s  censorship  system.  The
complex online “assemblage of surveillance, blockade, leakage, diversion, friction, and
disjuncture”  developed  by  the  Chinese  government  points  towards  extensions  of
censorial  expertise  into machinic  automatisms.  In  distinguishing  his  own  online
“moderating” activity (guanli)—in pursuit of “democratic enlightenment” and informed
by “basic civility and Islamic ethical conduct”—from such state censorship (shencha),
Wang’s interlocutor might be seen to echo the theme of a proportionality between self-
restraint and the silencing of others.
35 In  sum,  this  hypothesis  suggests  a  formalist  way  out  of  the  “undefinition”  of
censorship. Instead of distinguishing censorship from “good” silencing based on their
contents or actors, one might seek instead to identify the recurrent forms entailed in
actors’  own  distinctions  between  legitimate  and  unacceptable  censorship.  The
relationship of proportionality between silencing oneself and silencing others is one
such recurrent form of legitimation. There are others. One might mention, for instance,
the reversibility between censor and censored (today’s censored might—de jure or de
facto—be  tomorrow’s  censor)  which  in  some  contexts  founds  the  experience  of
belonging to a community of “peers”.3
 
Coda: On non-censorship
36 This observation leads us back towards an ethnographic reconsideration of the cultural
logic of liberal attitudes to censorship from which we began. Perhaps there is more
there, after all, than two philosophically untenable distinctions (recall: the distinction
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between action and communication,  on the one hand,  and between free  agent  and
restrictive  censor,  on  the  other).  The  idea  that  one  might  perfectly  draw  those
distinctions is rather the mark of a libertarian utopia (or dystopia) of a world without
social convention. A liberal antipathy to censorship need not, after all, go quite that far.
It  need  simply  imply  a  concern  with  drawing  the  line  between  legitimate  and
illegitimate silencing. As I suggested in the previous section, one way in which such
lines are drawn is through an attention to the proportionality between the silences one
requires of oneself and those one requires of others.
37 And yet this vision also draws our attention to an empirical fact which should after all
seem quite strange to anyone who has fully understood the message of New Censorship
Theory:  that censorship is  everywhere.  The stubborn empirical  fact is  that in some
settings, some forms of expression which self-consciously break with social convention,
which are profoundly unpalatable to a great majority of the population, which may well
be harmful to individuals or dangerous to the social order, and which the state has the
ability to silence, are nevertheless not silenced. Heywood (this volume) examines one
such case: the surprisingly sparing way in which Italian courts have been choosing to
apply a law which bans fascist propaganda. The pervasive consensus that censorship is
everywhere turns such cases of liberal non-censorship into an ethnographic problem in
need of explanation.
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NOTES
1. See Cody (2011) for a review of these arguments.
2. The  historian  cited  by  Brkovic,  according  to  whom  Yugoslav  filmmakers  might
respect Yugoslav censors because they were part of a shared cultural elite who know
what Expressionism is and were familiar with “the biography of Marinetti”, provides a
clear instance of this logic: where censorship was less critically viewed, it was precisely
because censors were recognised by the censored themselves as “peers”.
3. I am grateful to Emmanuel de Vienne for suggesting I render explicit the formalist
nature of the hypothesis.
ABSTRACTS
What is censorship? Is it different from other forms of silencing, and if so, how? Anthropology
can provide some useful disturbances to familiar liberal debates about freedom of speech by
expanding the cast of characters and the range of modalities of silence and expression. Yet the
lessons  of  anthropology’s  comparative  explorations  go  beyond  the  blithe  postmodern
observation that silencing is pervasive. To speak of censorship is to mark out certain forms of
silencing  as  illegitimate  and unacceptable.  An ethnographic  attentiveness  to  the  varieties  of
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silencing must therefore keep in view the evaluative work which notions of “censorship” do for
those who use them. Along the way of this comparative journey through techniques of silencing,
this introduction suggests a broader observation: that the elusive distinction between censorship
and legitimate silencing often relates to a sense of proportion between the silences actors impose
upon themselves and those which they are thereby authorised to require of others.
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